UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

IN RE:)	CASE NO: 07-20027		
)			
)			
SCOTIA DEVELOPMENT, LLC, AND)	Corpus Christi, Texas		
OFFICIAL UNSECURED CREDITORS')			
COMMITTEE,)			
)	Friday, December 5, 2008		
)	(8:59 a.m. to 9:06 a.m.		
Debtor.)			

OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS / MOTION HEARINGS

** PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT **
(RULING ONLY)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. SCHMIDT,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Appearances: See next page

Courtroom Deputy: Frenchie Carbia

Court Recorder: Janet Silika

Transcribed by: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc.

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

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Scotia Development, LLC: KATHRYN A. COLEMAN, ESQ.

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Official Unsecured MAXIM B. LITVAK, ESQ.

Creditor's Committee: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Also Present: BRIAN HALE, ESQ.

Corpus Christi, Texas; Friday, December 5, 2008; 8:59 a.m.

THE COURT: The first thing I wanted to do was I want to go ahead and announce my decision with respect to the Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher fee application.

I would start by saying that as a general rule that I found the representation of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher to be exemplary, despite the fact that they were involved in what might be called an ethical minefield in the sense that their representation throughout the case -- they were representing a debtor and were adverse to some interests and as the case proceeded and the status of the debtor, the opportunities of debtor plans changed their interests -- were required to change throughout the case.

I thought that they did an exemplary job of handling their client, as well as the interests of the case throughout the case and particularly in the confirmation hearing. I thought that their arguments and their witnesses were particularly helpful for the Court and provided benefit to the estate in the sense that I thought, in fact, that their witnesses and their argument were those that led the Court to make findings of amounts that perhaps would have otherwise been much lower for the value of some of the property.

Once that's said, then, evaluating the amounts of the application, there was no evidence presented to suggest that the amount of work that was done or that the fees charged on an

hourly basis were anything but within -- they were all necessary, that they were all reasonable and that the rates charged, considering the difficulty of the case, the size of the case, the national nature of the case, all of their rates were reasonable.

There were really only three areas of the fee application that I had trouble with. The first one is the amount that was charged for the contract lawyer service. It's important to note that the theory for fee applications, at least in the Southern District of Texas, is that all of the overhead charges of a law firm are included in the hourly rate of the lawyers and, therefore, as a result of that if it's necessary for you to hire lawyers and pay actual funds for those lawyers and you are providing overhead for those lawyers, the actual costs of those lawyers — those contract lawyers—does not include overhead, so it does seem appropriate to me to charge for overhead.

Now, my experience on what a reasonable overhead charge tells me, at least 20 years ago when I was in the practice of law, that it was perhaps more like 50 percent; in other words, the actual in comparison to the cost of the lawyers that perhaps it would be about 50 percent.

However, there was no evidence to suggest anything different than that the overhead that was actually expended by Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher associated with these lawyers was the

amount. Although it was higher than -- it was more than 100 percent of the actual cost of the lawyers -- there was nothing to indicate that that was not the actual overhead that was related to those lawyers -- the office space, the secretarial time, all of the other myriad of issues that comprise overhead; so that I believe that the amount that was suggested -- there were three parts to the fees charged for the contract lawyers: The actual fee, which I find to be reasonable; there was overhead, which probably over the last 20 years has probably gone up anyway --

So anyway, my experience does not outweigh the evidence before me, which suggests that it's whatever that they said it was, which there was nothing to -- no evidence to contradict that. So, I would find that that is reasonable.

I don't find anything to support the notion that you can also charge an additional profit margin. And I don't find any support for that. It would be similar to trying to charge profit for the use of the mail or, you know, when you had a mail charge, add a profit onto that. We don't allow that, so I don't know how I could allow profit in addition to the overhead charge and the actual charge. So, I am not approving the profit charge that was in it.

Then there were two minor other problems. In the Southern District of New York, it apparently is okay to feed office workers after hours. And for some reason, which escapes

me, the Southern District of Texas local rules don't provide
that. Quite honestly, I don't even necessarily agree with
that; however, since that's the rule in the Southern District
of Texas, I think I'm bound to follow it and so those minor
charges for food for office employees after hours have to be
extracted from the fee application.

The other local rule does not allow any charges for alcohol. There were some minor charges for alcohol on the bills, also. It's always been my theory that bankruptcy lawyers ought to be able to charge the same as other lawyers and I'm sure that it's customary to probably drink wine with a meal at night. But, I'm not going to go against the local rule.

And so, I will approve the fee application and you may submit an order that subtracts from the expenses the profit for the contract workers, the minor charges for -- I assume -- sandwiches at night for the office workers, and the minor charges for alcohol; and submit that order to me and I'll sign it.

(This portion of the proceeding concluded at 9:06 a.m.; hearing continued; not transcribed)

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Join Hudson

December 9, 2008

TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER